by Craig Hayden

I finally got around to reading the new strategic template for US public diplomacy as put together by the State Department – ostensibly the agency tasked with managing and directing US public diplomacy. The strategy is in a handy powerpoint presented by US Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith McHale. She spoke of it again on March 10, 2010 before the Senate Foreign Relations committee. A few things from the document and the speech stand out in my mind.

I admit I came to the document a bit skeptical. Supposedly, it took many months to prepare – and feedback was kept to a minimum (bloggers were invited to talk about the plan AFTER it was released). And indeed my initial reading was somewhat disappointing. It read like McHale’s crack team of strategic planners had planned to step out of the TARDIS time machine in 2001 rather than, say, 2010. Simply put, the document reads too much as a dated conception of message management designed to counter or compete with the actions of other actors like China, Russia, and extremists groups (nevermind that their respective programs are for decidedly different objectives and have questionable effectiveness – they are doing stuff, so should we!). Aren’t US public diplomacy planners done with the “there’s a media war going on” kind of talk?

Yet interestingly, the document provides a compelling picture of the “complex global challenges” facing the US, including human rights, women’s rights, climate change, food security, etc. These are not just contexts for public diplomacy. They imply warrants for an aggressive public diplomacy that’s crucial for US diplomacy in a broader sense:

Making progress on these issues requires complex, multi-dimensional public engagement strategies to forge partnerships, mobilize broad coalitions, and galvanize public opinion across all sectors of society: activists and academics, business and civil society leaders, faith communities and NGOs

Put another way – the challenges of US foreign policy necessitates a kind of diplomacy does not make clear distinctions between diplomacy and public diplomacy. That said, the strategic implications of this move are not fully elaborated in admittedly limited venue of the slides.

So here are a few of my quick takes on statements made in support of the strategic imperatives. Language from the McHale document will be bolded. The statements are for the most part fine – but not exactly representative of a “change” in the Obama-inspired sense of the term. There is much here that is a continuation of previous conventional wisdom. I’m going to leave out comments about what I liked, and focus on what I find questionable.

1. Shape the narrative (develop proactive outreach strategies to inform, inspire, and persuade);” Develop and implement country/region-specific targeted media engagement plans to strengthen U.S. ability to shape the narrative and proactively present U.S. views

Sure, though clearly we need to consider the limits of the global communication infrastructure and indeed US ability to control any narrative and expect predicted outcomes. It’s not the US shouldn’t try to advocate a particular form of framing – that is, promote the kinds of evaluative stories that circulate about the US and its policies. But the US needs to understand the limitations of marketing-based analysis. And more importantly, the US needs to understand how such frames (or narratives) are created, acquire credibility, and in turn lock out alternative representations of the US. I’m pretty sure that “shaping the narrative” is a not straightforward task for public diplomacy.

Increase operating freedom for frontline staff at post through more flexible and nimble engagement with media and build capacity for aggressive, timely response

This is fine to say, but how do we reconcile this kind of flexibility with the institutional culture that may not incentivize a kind of “open source” approach to engagement? Off the cuff candor and The State Department don’t always appear in the same sentence in my head.

Recruit a leader for International Information Programs (IIP) with a deep understanding of behaviors, attitudes and preferences in international markets; strengthen capacity to analyze target audiences, leverage new technologies, and manage strategic outreach campaigns

When I first read this I thought – “We need someone who actually knows what they are doing.” But seriously folks, it seems to me like a lot of responsibility is being ladled onto IIP. In particular, balancing the goals of “shaping global dialogue” (does that mean CONTROLLING?), “communicating US perspectives,” and “countering misinformation” seems like a sweeping mandate. What it really sounds like is a serious intervention into both the content and structure of how information circulates about the US. As Robert Entman concisely pointed out in 2008 – this is not an easy task, and may very well be impossible. So perhaps the US should re-articulate its strategic imperatives towards something that is more realistic and less resonant with the information warfare vocabulary it inherited from the Cold War Bush administration.

2. “Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships (build mutual trust and respect through expanded Public Diplomacy programs and platforms);”

Use social networking and connective technologies more effectively. Leverage new tools to communicate U.S. perspectives where appropriate. Participate in informal dialogues in new conversation spaces. Empower individuals to use these tools to play constructive roles within their own communities.

While I know that State Department people like Alec Ross and Jared Cohen are quick to temper the expectations of new technological tools for US diplomacy – I’m not sure if this kind of attitude has really filtered into the discussion of social networking technology for US PD. What do we expect these technologies to do? The empowerment angle is a good start, but I think there’s some more room here to articulate a coherent social media strategy. Empowerment does not begin with “Friending the US.” That said – I still think it’s an open question as to whether the US provision of social networking services (e.g. in Mexico, Pakistan) can translate into tangible “PD” gains – as if we had a metric to assess that anyway.

Deepen our connections with alumni of USG programs through better long-term outreach programs. Greatly expand alumni coordination, tracking, and outreach to turn these potential resources into credible advocates and community organizers

The fact that this is still an imperative is problematic. This really is a no-brainer.

3. “Combat violent extremism (counter violent extremist voices, discredit and delegitimize al Qaeda, and empower credible local voices);”

Honestly, I don’t think this is a job for US PD. Making this a key pillar of the US strategy elevates the extremist community too greatly. Public diplomacy should address the threat of extremism (whether Islamic or otherwise) through indirect means, by shaping the broader contours of global civil society and empowering others to diminish the space where extremists can flourish. Combating extremisms is a job for covert and overt psychological operations and a specific definition of strategic communication. However,

Provide tools and platforms for independent voices to expand their reach. Facilitate linkages between post contacts to create stronger civil society networks to advocate more effectively; provide access and training in social media to create broader platforms for local voices; equip post contacts with useful information and resources to deepen their impact

… this may very well be a good idea and continues to elaborate the role that PD could play as demonstrating a kind of value and credibility, rather than simply searching for new magic bullets to extol US virtues.

Yes, there needs to be ways to disrupt the kind of networks that sustain particular narratives to recruit and cultivate extremists. I’m not convinced this should be the central imperative for public diplomacy. This is one of those cases where the DoD can, and does, play a significant tactical and strategic role. And where we might find some disagreement over the definition of public diplomacy.

4. “Better inform policy-making (ensure foreign policy is informed upfront by an understanding of attitudes and opinions of foreign publics);”

This is the final frontier of PD recommendations – the avoidance of Murrow’s famous “crash landings.” I also think this kind of recommendation is nice to say, but it would require a considerable effort to combat the inertia the currently drives US foreign policy and diplomatic practice. Which is why the following statements are problematic:

Bolster capabilities to conduct and disseminate market and consumer research that tracks and analyzes important trends in global behavior and opinion

Leverage research and analysis to inform foreign policy formulation and tailor outreach to resonate with target audiences

Ensure that Public Diplomacy’s expertise and understanding of societal trends informs foreign policy formulation and implementation

First, the GAO has been repeatedly adamant about measurement and evaluation for US PD and strategic communication. But we need to make sure that there is use for the data. Put another way, what use is there for sophisticated measurements if there is no clear end for its use? In McHale’s strategic document there are a lot of different justifications and objectives for PD, which in turn would require a diversity of measures.

Simply deferring to the marketing state of the art is not a panacea. AC Nielson rating and certain kinds of polling may be of limited use when the goals of US PD transcend the management of customer relations or brand recognition. Rather, there may need to be some creative, innovative analysis that directly captures the implications of relationships and reveals routes to influence. For example, quantitative social network analysis and in-depth media ethnographies of diasporic populations might be used in conjunction with more traditional marketing-derived analysis to meet the needs of US strategic planning and assessment. Clearly, the US cannot simply import a plug-in-play evaluative framework derived from best practices in the commercial sector. The analysis solution will likely involve such practices, but also the creative input of PD professionals and cultural experts with years in the field.

Second, the contribution of PD to the formulation of foreign policy sounds so incredibly optimistic I am tempted to call in disingenuous. Rather, what I anticipate happening is not that PD will revolutionize diplomacy or US foreign policy, but that diplomatic practice will come to recognize the conceptual apparatus of public diplomacy as necessarily part of its own practices. PD won’t transform US foreign policy. PD – as both a concept and a set of practices – will be appropriated by those institutional actors empowered to actually do it. We can already see this with the DoD. At State, people like Alec Ross and indeed the implications of Secretary Clinton’s “architecture of cooperation” signal this kind of slow transformation in the identity of US statecraft.

5. “Deploy resources in line with current priorities (strengthen structures and processes to ensure coordinated and effective Public Diplomacy).”

This is the big whopper. It speaks directly to the question of leadership. Who is in charge of US PD? Who can effectively authorize and direct what is necessary for PD? Who can have the kind of resources and indeed, strategic agility, to actively craft a necessary and proactive US public diplomacy? While many want State to be in charge (and indeed defer to the direction of State), we then get statements like this from McHale:

The Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC), which is part of my office, is specifically chartered to support the NSC’s Global Engagement Directorate. We are expanding and upgrading GSEC to strengthen its ability to contribute across a broad range of U.S. government strategic communications and global engagement activities. To head the new GSEC, I have recruited Ambassador Richard LeBaron, formerly our Ambassador to Kuwait and one of our senior-most Foreign Service officers. He will arrive on the job this summer.

Ok, so we know that her office participates in meetings with both the NSC and DoD. But more importantly, where does the buck stop? It’s nice to know that the State Department’s “R” is a team player, but what now? I’m not suggesting that there needs to be central message control. I am suggesting the distributed responsibility that currently defines US public diplomacy leadership is a major reason that us PD critics are still having our critical discussion. This quote from McHale implies, at least in my mind, that maybe NSC could be directing global advocacy programs (which, btw, are only a part of what it means to do PD). Or more likely, that there’s enough implicit direction from the NSC so as to defray any substantive criticism about US public diplomacy’s strategic failures from the State Department. It’s not R’s failures. It’s the structure.

That said, I think this is ultimately a political issue that need to resolved by those with the authority and will to do so. As some have suggested, this issue of responsibility and resources may have to be worked out by Congress. Which isn’t a very comforting thought at this point. But I have some hope that leadership is out there.

More on McHale’s public diplomacy strategy presentation and the controversy surrounding it a forthcoming post.