Intermap

by Craig Hayden

I have to admit, I was not among the esteemed body of attendees who descended on Howard Gilman Foundation’s White Oak conference center in Florida last month to discuss public diplomacy. Thanks to blogging – I get to provide some input. The following is my reaction to some of the recommendations that emerged from the meeting.

Based on the report, I think the most glaring item missing is an operational definition of PD that draws together all the disparate elements (that the U.S. government wants to draw together, at least) and contains some sense of what P.D is supposed to “do.” That said, I don’t want to rehash the debate about what PD “is” or “is not.” That’s increasingly unproductive for academic analysts, and potentially divisive for tying together institutional competencies.

The reason I say this is because there are very real differences, both in terms of policy and ethics, between strategic communication (advocacy), international broadcasting (journalism), and exchange/cultural diplomacy that are not easily reconciled in obvious ways. Sure, we can follow Matt Armstrong’s lead and assume they are all tactics in a strategic emphasis on “engagement.” – but if global communication is increasingly structured by contests of credibility (which the report acknowledges) – then we must assume that some forms of PD can potentially damage the credibility of other PD practices if they are too tightly (and visibly) bound.

However, I’m not sure how much of that matters anymore. There is much discussion in the report about “structure” – such as the need for a coordinating agency, an informed leader, and broad-based government (and private sector) involvement. While institutional arrangements are crucial – I still wonder if org chart artifacts like the BBG’s “firewall” function that like they are supposed to in preserving the integrity of US international broadcasting campaigns, or, for that matter any aspect of U.S. public diplomacy. People with more current knowledge on trends in IB might speak to this, but I still hear anecdotal evidence about how even vaunted programs like VOA are now “propaganda” in some audiences. Ok. Back to White Oak. Here are some thoughts on a few of the points:

Personnel: Public diplomacy is not an “anyone-can-do-it” profession .New geopolitical realities and communications tools reinforce rather than diminish the continuing need for a professional public diplomacy corps. — This begs the question – just who exactly are the people that should comprise this new professional corps? Does this mean that the Foreign Service should actively seek skills developed in communication (dare I say, PR?) or perhaps in new media technologies? This might also mean that State (assuming it remains/becomes the principal institutional lead in PD) develop its own internal “skunk works” for PD and PD training. Incidentally, I freely admit to borrowing that term from Daryl Copland, author of the forthcoming Guerrilla Diplomacy.)

Lurking behind the personnel issue is a large question about relevant knowledge. James Glassman and Marc Lynch both suggest that PD leadership should be experienced in international relations. Which makes me think, what body of theories, methods, and experiences should inform the repertoire of U.S. public diplomacy in the future?

Technology/Communication: We must better integrate the new tools of communication with the current “human contact” programs and relationship-development efforts that have long been the backbone of public diplomacy. – This point also warns against thinking that ICTs can stand in for in-person PD programs. Perhaps I’m mistaken, but I’m not convinced that anyone is suggesting that so-called “PD 2.0″ technologies are thought to be a central emphasis in PD 2.0. (DipNote and the Digital Outreach teams are small first steps towards integrating platforms with this strategy). As Glassman argued, PD 2.0 is an “attitude” not a “technology.” Obviously, communication interventions require awareness of the communication infrastructure – the media/information technologies and the centrality of these outlets in the daily lives of geographically or ethnically-defined publics.

What I think is more distressing for some planners is, perhaps, the ethic that goes with embracing a PD 2.0 attitude. We already have a sense that U.S. public diplomacy might benefit from the unique contextual knowledge coming from the posts. As PD strategists come to admit that PD cannot improve simply by Washington getting the message right, PD 2.0 adds another layer of open-source complexity to the “message.” This is an enduring tension – between centralized control over communications, the traditional purview of foreign policy managers, and the localized micro-context of communications and media that the post must operate within. Allowing programs that take advantage of social networking technology to open up the “message” to open-source contributions is a significant cultural change – and likely fuels suspicion of technology in PD as much as potentials for removing the “last 3 feet.” On a related note, I don’t think anyone at State has been fired yet for the “Democracy Video challenge.”

Leadership and Coordination: Public diplomacy needs a “quarterback” with the knowledge and
authority to reach across government and into the private sector to quickly address mission, structure,
staffing and resource issues. — This was also a theme at the Smith-Mundt conference – though there wasn’t much agreement on what would this would look like institutionally. By this, I mean there was no easy answer to create a new independent public diplomacy agency. This report’s recommendation seems to favor a possible relocation of leadership into the NSC. I don’t claim to be an NSC wonk, but I wonder if leadership on PD would get the kind of institutional support from DoD and State if it were there. Speaking of symbolic association, I’ve yet to digest the implications of the as-yet-to-be-named (McHale?) Undersecretary of State for PD being relocated off the State Department’s main building.

Finally, I thought it would be necessary to post this:

Stakeholders: Holistic Approach: Public diplomacy is relevant to a broad array of strategic interests and has multiple stakeholders: military and non-military, Executive and Congressional, public and private sector. We need to identify the needs and strengths of each stakeholder and determine together how to best play to (support, staff and fund) the strengths of each.

While I completely agree with this statement, I think it is obvious at this point (especially after the avalanche of PD reports on U.S. PD since 2001). The question now is, how do you construct the shared stakeholders into a coherent (albeit distributed) group?