Their work is justified around the promotion and exchange of culture and values through education – and the word “diplomacy” seemed oddly out of place. More to the point, I think there was an aversion to thinking about culture and values from an instrumental perspective (read: for the promotion of Chinese foreign policy objectives). I realize there are good reasons to avoid casting your job as a kind of public/cultural diplomacy – but it remains an intriguing question. For public diplomacy to work – does it need to disavow the label? The Confucius Institute arguably does great work, and offers an important conceptual distinction akin to outfits like the British Council: where a cultural diplomacy center sustains its credibility by its independence from government policy-making.

This kind of self-identification sustains the historical difficulty in linking public and cultural diplomacy. This historical trend, however, may be at odds with the nascent “fusionist” perspective elsewhere, where organizations like the US Dept of State increasingly employ the implicit language and strategies of public diplomacy in their redefinition of traditional diplomatic institutions. I’m not sure how these two trends would be easily resolved conceptually or institutionally.

Last week, Gallup released its findings from a 2008 survey of 4349 adults around the world and reported that there was an inverse relationship between the level of access people have to communications infrastructures and their approval of U.S. leadership. Put simply: the more access people have to information, the less likely they were to be supportive of U.S. leadership.

These findings are terrible news for American PD practitioners that have been working tirelessly to get America’s message out into the global info-sphere. Indeed, many PD initiatives today, like the State Department’s efforts to reach out and engage Arab bloggers, Colleen Graffy’s Tweetfest, DipNote, the Rapid Reaction Communications Unit and, of course, Alhurra each operate with the fundamental premise that once we get our message out there in its entirety, people will come around to our point of view. As it turns out, this premise is simply not true. Indeed, the more connected a global citizen was, i.e. the more likely they were to have access to the communiqué of American policies, the less likely they were to support American leadership.

Importantly, Gallup’s findings call into question whether the Department of State’s recent surge in “Public Diplomacy 2.0”—at least in terms of how it is currently conceptualized—may not be the most effective way to proceed. For instance, the study found that those with home access to the internet were more likely to disapprove of U.S. leadership (55%) when compared to those without home access to the internet (31%). Moreover, these numbers demonstrate that there may even be some tension between U.S. development goals and foreign policies abroad. If helping underdeveloped communities in Africa, Asia and Latin America get better access to the global communication infrastructure results in a decrease in support for American leadership abroad, then it seems like we’re shooting ourselves in the foot. Alternatively, China may be on to something: by helping Africa leapfrog into the 21st century ICT network, it may be effectively countering U.S. hegemony without ever having to deploy a single soldier.