I am curious to hear the following statement, made by one of America’s preeminent critics of public diplomacy thinking, clarified a bit more:

All too many academic theories about PD are incomprehensible, pompously-expressed “concepts” from persons — among them rightfully esteemed tenured professors whose intelligence is all too often joined with a tactless inability to handle the last three feet of person-to-person contact — who have never actually worked as diplomats in the field of “public diplomacy,” which they pontificate about, often too assuredly, from their ivory towers on comfortable campuses so distant from what some call the “real world.”

The quote appeared in a recent article on the Huffington Post. Truth be told, I am admittedly a fan of John Brown and his frequent skewerings of pretension (unless, of course, such barbs are leveled at my alma mater, then I’m shamelessly hypocritical). But it made me pause. Perhaps Dr. Brown was being polite, but I think we need to put some sort of name to the real troublemakers that Brown is alluding to.

Put another way – what is the real problem that bothers Dr. Brown? What sort of creeping threat is posed by public diplomacy theorists? Is it a particular theory and or scholar that threatens the bedrock of practical pedagogy in public diplomacy? Is it the pervasive valorization of technological approaches to public diplomacy, which might focus state sponsors to direct scarce resources away from proven public diplomacy practice and training?

I think there is more to this sweeping indictment of the academic study of public diplomacy than meets the eye. At first glance, it makes me feel a bit defensive (since I happen to be one of those academics who has never been in the foreign service). It’s practically discouraging – and seems to perpetuate the persistent scholar-practitioner divide that looms between teachers of international relations and diplomats. And to be fair – both sides contribute to this divide. So really I ask – what’s the big deal? Should scholars interested in public diplomacy pack up their bags and join the foreign service? Barring that, is the Huffington Post essay really a reminder to keep scholars in their place?

The critique of academics is also oddly out of place, since Brown’s essay is ostensibly a reaction to the recent NYT Times article about practitioners of social media-based engagement and “21st Century Statecraft” at the State Department.

I say let’s keep the diplomacy between the camps going. I will start this process with an olive branch in the form of a question to skeptical policy veterans: “What would the practitioners of public diplomacy have the scholars of public diplomacy study, research, and teach?”

p.s. – I actually think Brown’s objections about “abstraction” reflect a long-standing debate amongst academics on the philosophy of social science inquiry. Do we scholars pursue deductive-nomethetic prescriptions, covering laws about the workings of social world, or, should the purpose of social science (and scholarly investigation more generally) be geared towards more middle-range theories applicable to the complex and messy realities of foreign policy. As I have stated before, I really doubt there is such theorizing about public diplomacy at the level Brown is concerned about – though I agree with his skepticism in a purely academic sense. And for the record, I’m fine with people making claims about theory and the standards of inquiry outside of the academy. Insert winking emoticon here.

Quick take on the July 29 New York Times article about the twitterific musings of the State Department’s senior technology advisors, Alec Ross and Jared Cohen.

The article “Twitter Musings in Syria Elicit Groans in Washington” addresses the discomfort caused by Ross and Cohen’s candid musings about their experience while traveling Syria for the State Department. The two were “riffing about how visitors can buy an American-style blended iced coffee at a university near Damascus and how one of them had challenged a Syrian communications minister to a cake-eating contest.”

Sounds like a perfectly reasonable use of Twitter to me. Yet apparently the two were gently chided by the State Department. Supposedly, the State Department does actually support the embrace of such technology as part of 21st century diplomacy. As the NYT’s piece suggests: “Yet despite the youthful indiscretion, their broader goal of using technology to further diplomacy enjoys enthusiastic support from the highest levels of the department, notably Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton.”

So why is this a “youthful indiscretion?” This sounds profoundly out of sync with what I understand to be the real implication of social media for diplomacy. Social media like Twitter and facebook are not just other vehicles to address target audiences; touchpoints in a slick marketing campaign. They are means by which the State Department can be rendered something other than a monolithic voice of the US government. They reveal the human faces of the US government, and not just another sloganeering or exposition platform. It is through these media that credibility can be cultivated, by providing ways to identify with communities of social media users, to show that government social media users listen and participate in such communities.

Perhaps this is not such a big deal. Perhaps the report is as much a reflection of the framing of the news story as it is actual conflict within State. There are some very intelligent people at State who “get” the social implications of social media. I just found this article to strike against the spirit of engagement present in social media.

So I was at the Confucius Institute at the University of Maryland this week doing some research for my book on comparative public diplomacy. I had a great discussion with the directors of the program. They offered a number of insights and were very welcoming. I’d like to share something that came out of the meeting that adds some perspective to recent US attempts to rehabilitate US public diplomacy strategy. The individuals I spoke with seemed pretty sure what they did was not public diplomacy – and were somewhat ambivalent about the term cultural diplomacy. For the Confucius Institute – their “mission” was primarily defined as education and educational partnership.

Their work is justified around the promotion and exchange of culture and values through education – and the word “diplomacy” seemed oddly out of place. More to the point, I think there was an aversion to thinking about culture and values from an instrumental perspective (read: for the promotion of Chinese foreign policy objectives). I realize there are good reasons to avoid casting your job as a kind of public/cultural diplomacy – but it remains an intriguing question. For public diplomacy to work – does it need to disavow the label? The Confucius Institute arguably does great work, and offers an important conceptual distinction akin to outfits like the British Council: where a cultural diplomacy center sustains its credibility by its independence from government policy-making.

This kind of self-identification sustains the historical difficulty in linking public and cultural diplomacy. This historical trend, however, may be at odds with the nascent “fusionist” perspective elsewhere, where organizations like the US Dept of State increasingly employ the implicit language and strategies of public diplomacy in their redefinition of traditional diplomatic institutions. I’m not sure how these two trends would be easily resolved conceptually or institutionally.

I had the good fortune to attend a discussion last week between Alec Ross, the Senior Advisor for Innovation in the office of Secretary of State Clinton and Marc Lynch, professor of political science at George Washington University and a featured blogger on Foreign Policy.com. The focus of the discussion was primarily about the use of media technology for outreach and public diplomacy in the Arab world. Each gave a short presentation that talked about the need for embracing technology, and for sustaining realistic attitudes towards what communication technology can accomplish for the US State Department. For this blog post, I’ll summarize a few of the interesting points they raised:

Alec Ross:

- The US needs to focus on technologies of empowerment. Online content in particular is important to youthful audiences in the Middle East. Online content has a distinct kind of authority (compared to other media outlets) in this population.
- “Connection Technologies” are being used by many actors, including US antagonists.
- Such technologies have evolved to provide info, build community, and more importantly, to provide resources. E.g. – the web is a transactional medium.

For Ross, there are 2 positive and negative trends that go along with the increasingly ubiquitous information and communication technology in the region:

Negative Trends
1. Censorship and government infiltration of connection media is up (and not just in Iran and China).
2. Such media technologies are increasingly used for radicalization (Not just blogs and discussion forums, but video games as well).

Positive Trends
1. Increasing connectedness among the Middle East populace (reduction of the digital divide; dramatic increase in mobile handsets).
2. Reassertion of science and technology as an area of social and political emphasis in conservative and M.E. countries.

Marc Lynch

Lynch offered that we can’t just focus on particular technologies as politically transformative in the Middle East. Blogs, Twitter, Facebook, Paltalk, etc. are all trends. In his view, information seeks outlets, and we need to focus on the broader communication environment.

He suggested that we pay attention to how successful opinion leaders adopt new media platforms. And he discouraged paying attention to any specific media or message. What he calls “the forces of the status quo” (Arab governments, etc.) have caught up with new media technology, and thus radical groups usage of such technologies have been “defanged.”

What Lynch was driving at, in my estimation, is that we need a better understanding of how information flows and likewise, how people may be able to act on information (for as we know, some in the Middle East have access and blog, tweet, etc but can’t have a real political effect on their situation). Rather, we need to comprehend how such media transparency can lead to real accountability.

On the subject of social networking technologies, Lynch wonders how we can know at this stage what kind of relationships established through these platforms are significant enough (say, for public diplomacy) – and whether they are real or spurious.

Alec Ross then jumped in on the social media discussion, noting there is a significant difference between using such platforms for a US presidential campaign and using them for public diplomacy. The transaction is more obvious.

Ross noted that the “Cold War frame” for PD was “institutional.” People don’t want to get connected to institutions. (As an aside, I wonder what it means when we “Friend” the US on facebook? Does that mean Uncle Sam gets to see my crazy college photos? Does this count as engagement?)

But I digress. Ross goes on to say that we need a rich understanding of the local context for social networking to use it more effectively. On a related note, he suggested the State Department may need to rethink its strategy of “branding the Secretary” – and look to those individuals that represent the US on the ground in a local way. Public diplomacy may, in this view, emulate the practices of successful personalities (popular, influential, etc.) that have built up networks and institutions around them. At a practical level this might start with the US ambassador – to personalize the practice of US PD. We don’t relate to institutions in the same way we do to personalities. This may be a fundamental aspect of credibility in a highly media-saturated environment.

When pressed on what “success” might look like in public diplomacy, Ross pointed to the recently released Opinion Space project, a collaboration between the State Department and the Digital Media Lab at UC Berkeley, as an example of a new way to engage – a discussion forum organized as a visual representation of topics and opinions. It provides a potentially instructive form of mapping the contours of global public opinion around issues related to US foreign policy. Yet Ross acknowledged that it is still an open question whether the US can successfully implement an online community that is operated by a government. Also, the government should not embark on kinds of ventures that are “counter-veiling to the market.” I understand this as the government trying to use social media tools in ways for which they are not designed for, or, to try and impose strategic imperatives on tools for which they are ill-suited. (Lugar’s argument that we can “win the war of ideas through twitter” comes to my mind).

Lynch also sounded a word of caution on the need to “fill every space” with a government media presence. Similarly, given the volume of access that US presence in such networks affords – how can the US effectively respond to millions of tweets, emails, and facebook posts? And importantly, who should do the responding?

The talk was a stimulating look at how the US government is grappling with the social and political ramfications of a changing communication infrastructure in the Middle East. I disagree with some of what was said – in particular Lynch’s sort of neutral conception of the value of information in a sociological/cultural sense. But I think Lynch is right to note that public diplomacy (or whatever’s its going to be called in the future) needs to reflect a localized understanding of how technology shapes the routes to influence – both those social relations and bonds that rely on communication networks, as well as how the technological medium changes the nature of what counts as credible, persuasive messaging itself.

When the US State Department makes statements about how it needs to “shape the narrative” – it should start by noting how such narratives both reflect and constitute the social bonds, networks, and cultural structures that are the real terrain of public diplomacy. By embracing the notion that we can “shape” such things, we transgress potentially sensitive symbolic resources – so we should be careful to assert such goals without a rich social understanding. I am tentatively encouraged by both Ross and Lynch, and look forward to more thinking on this subject. The State Department’s “R” division is working out its game plan. Yet the frontlines of public diplomacy – the regional bureaus and the embassies – need this kind of thinking sooner rather than later.

So I’ve had some time to digest the conversation on McHale’s proposed new framework for US public diplomacy strategy. Upon reflection, as Rhonda Zaharna describes in her insightful and clarifying new book, Battles to Bridges: US Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy after 9/11, the framework is yet another example of how “grand strategy,” “strategy,” and “tactics” get muddled in the conceptualization of public diplomacy objectives and the world-view that it is based upon.

The sticking points in public reactions to this framework take on two distinct dimensions: conceptual and structural.

The first, epitomized by Phil Seib’s excoriation, is that the proposal offers nothing fundamentally new. Seib has a particular vision of what it should have focused on:

Nothing in the new plan addresses the need for public diplomacy to worry less about branding and more about service; to step away from Cold War-style monologue and embrace a comprehensive plan for interactive communication; to shift from a Middle East-centric public diplomacy to a more balanced global outlook; to realistically employ public diplomacy as an antiterrorism tool; and to reach out to diasporic populations and virtual states.

Seib’s critique is conceptual and strategic. There are elements, however, of what he is asking for already in the framework. It’s just that they are emphasized as crucial, or, they are mentioned alongside some of the more antiquated conceptions that continue to define US public diplomacy thinking.

Others have noted that the framework doesn’t really read like strategy at all, but more like a laundry list of things to do, or to express that the US do more.

Matt Armstrong has also noted in various venues that the framework continues to foreground the conceptual distinction between foreign and domestic, when, as Seib also notes – the notion of the foreign is complicated by the fact that states are increasingly virtual. Nation-states are interpenetrated by diasporic populations, both mobile and connected via technology, that complicate the notion of “target audience,” if not the impossibility of a stable notion of audience.

The final conceptual critique seems to center on the notion of “listening.” Essentially – the framework does not emphasize the actions and responsiveness that would reflect a strategic posture of listening. For many in the critical community of PD watchers, the notion of listening is the final frontier of real transformation. It also happens to be the concept that would most tightly bind the functions of PD with the overarching foreign policy apparatus.

The other strand of critique is structural. Bill Kiehl, commenting on MountainRunner, notes that the proposal to add new regional DAS’s to help coordinate the bureau’s with McHale’s office has already been tried. Kiehl writes:

This is not exactly the change that public diplomacy needs. Fussing around the edges instead of a major structural change will not make enough of a difference. The public diplomacy DAS in the six regional bureaus idea was tried before and it proved to be ineffective in either bridging the gap to policy or in bringing some unity of command to public diplomacy abroad. Putting a DAS for international public affairs in perhaps the most dysfunctional bureau in the State Department (PA) will not cure the dysfunction or dramatically improve the “message” to overseas audiences. There is really nothing here that inspires confidence that America’s public diplomacy will improve.

What’s interesting, at least from my perspective, is that the structure appears to be as much an internal appeal to revitalizing the “R” division of public diplomacy among the functions of the State Department as much as it is a necessary structure for an effective PD. I say this because of the continued presence of figures like Alec Ross, who operate clearly in the conceptual domain of PD, yet are not in fact under the authority of McHale. The Undersecretary’s new framework, as an organization template, is an assertion of organizational relevance as much as a strategic argument.

Of course the framework is not without its defenders. Or rather, the critics are not immune to criticism. In the comments section of another Phil Seib post on the framework, James Glassman, President George W Bush’s last Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs takes Seib to task for being too general and sweeping in his criticism.

But I think that what Seib may be getting at, something I’ve heard echoed elsewhere, is that the framework is not really reflective of what has been said repeatedly for years by academics and policy commentators regarding public diplomacy. I’m sure that individuals like Seib can acknowledge the positive steps taken by leaders like Glassman to revitalize US public diplomacy, but I don’t think Seib’s critique rests entirely the structural, procedural, and resourcing of PD. Seib, like myself, is concerned with conceptual reform – perhaps a reform so radical as to be difficult to embrace easily. I’ve been writing about an evolution of public diplomacy that would invert the functions of public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy; an effacement of conceptual boundaries that will likely be driven by foreign policy objectives more than top-down institutional redesign.

This kind of conceptual identity change requires input and reflexivity from the State Department. A willingness to accept outsider perspectives and wisdom. It strikes me that Seib’s points on the framework reveal a more insular strategy formation process than he or others are comfortable with.

I finally got around to reading the new strategic template for US public diplomacy as put together by the State Department – ostensibly the agency tasked with managing and directing US public diplomacy. The strategy is in a handy powerpoint presented by US Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith McHale. She spoke of it again on March 10, 2010 before the Senate Foreign Relations committee. A few things from the document and the speech stand out in my mind.

I admit I came to the document a bit skeptical. Supposedly, it took many months to prepare – and feedback was kept to a minimum (bloggers were invited to talk about the plan AFTER it was released). And indeed my initial reading was somewhat disappointing. It read like McHale’s crack team of strategic planners had planned to step out of the TARDIS time machine in 2001 rather than, say, 2010. Simply put, the document reads too much as a dated conception of message management designed to counter or compete with the actions of other actors like China, Russia, and extremists groups (nevermind that their respective programs are for decidedly different objectives and have questionable effectiveness – they are doing stuff, so should we!). Aren’t US public diplomacy planners done with the “there’s a media war going on” kind of talk?

Yet interestingly, the document provides a compelling picture of the “complex global challenges” facing the US, including human rights, women’s rights, climate change, food security, etc. These are not just contexts for public diplomacy. They imply warrants for an aggressive public diplomacy that’s crucial for US diplomacy in a broader sense:

Making progress on these issues requires complex, multi-dimensional public engagement strategies to forge partnerships, mobilize broad coalitions, and galvanize public opinion across all sectors of society: activists and academics, business and civil society leaders, faith communities and NGOs

Put another way – the challenges of US foreign policy necessitates a kind of diplomacy does not make clear distinctions between diplomacy and public diplomacy. That said, the strategic implications of this move are not fully elaborated in admittedly limited venue of the slides.

So here are a few of my quick takes on statements made in support of the strategic imperatives. Language from the McHale document will be bolded. The statements are for the most part fine – but not exactly representative of a “change” in the Obama-inspired sense of the term. There is much here that is a continuation of previous conventional wisdom. I’m going to leave out comments about what I liked, and focus on what I find questionable.

1. Shape the narrative (develop proactive outreach strategies to inform, inspire, and persuade);” Develop and implement country/region-specific targeted media engagement plans to strengthen U.S. ability to shape the narrative and proactively present U.S. views

Sure, though clearly we need to consider the limits of the global communication infrastructure and indeed US ability to control any narrative and expect predicted outcomes. It’s not the US shouldn’t try to advocate a particular form of framing – that is, promote the kinds of evaluative stories that circulate about the US and its policies. But the US needs to understand the limitations of marketing-based analysis. And more importantly, the US needs to understand how such frames (or narratives) are created, acquire credibility, and in turn lock out alternative representations of the US. I’m pretty sure that “shaping the narrative” is a not straightforward task for public diplomacy.

Increase operating freedom for frontline staff at post through more flexible and nimble engagement with media and build capacity for aggressive, timely response

This is fine to say, but how do we reconcile this kind of flexibility with the institutional culture that may not incentivize a kind of “open source” approach to engagement? Off the cuff candor and The State Department don’t always appear in the same sentence in my head.

Recruit a leader for International Information Programs (IIP) with a deep understanding of behaviors, attitudes and preferences in international markets; strengthen capacity to analyze target audiences, leverage new technologies, and manage strategic outreach campaigns

When I first read this I thought – “We need someone who actually knows what they are doing.” But seriously folks, it seems to me like a lot of responsibility is being ladled onto IIP. In particular, balancing the goals of “shaping global dialogue” (does that mean CONTROLLING?), “communicating US perspectives,” and “countering misinformation” seems like a sweeping mandate. What it really sounds like is a serious intervention into both the content and structure of how information circulates about the US. As Robert Entman concisely pointed out in 2008 – this is not an easy task, and may very well be impossible. So perhaps the US should re-articulate its strategic imperatives towards something that is more realistic and less resonant with the information warfare vocabulary it inherited from the Cold War Bush administration.

2. “Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships (build mutual trust and respect through expanded Public Diplomacy programs and platforms);”

Use social networking and connective technologies more effectively. Leverage new tools to communicate U.S. perspectives where appropriate. Participate in informal dialogues in new conversation spaces. Empower individuals to use these tools to play constructive roles within their own communities.

While I know that State Department people like Alec Ross and Jared Cohen are quick to temper the expectations of new technological tools for US diplomacy – I’m not sure if this kind of attitude has really filtered into the discussion of social networking technology for US PD. What do we expect these technologies to do? The empowerment angle is a good start, but I think there’s some more room here to articulate a coherent social media strategy. Empowerment does not begin with “Friending the US.” That said – I still think it’s an open question as to whether the US provision of social networking services (e.g. in Mexico, Pakistan) can translate into tangible “PD” gains – as if we had a metric to assess that anyway.

Deepen our connections with alumni of USG programs through better long-term outreach programs. Greatly expand alumni coordination, tracking, and outreach to turn these potential resources into credible advocates and community organizers

The fact that this is still an imperative is problematic. This really is a no-brainer.

3. “Combat violent extremism (counter violent extremist voices, discredit and delegitimize al Qaeda, and empower credible local voices);”

Honestly, I don’t think this is a job for US PD. Making this a key pillar of the US strategy elevates the extremist community too greatly. Public diplomacy should address the threat of extremism (whether Islamic or otherwise) through indirect means, by shaping the broader contours of global civil society and empowering others to diminish the space where extremists can flourish. Combating extremisms is a job for covert and overt psychological operations and a specific definition of strategic communication. However,

Provide tools and platforms for independent voices to expand their reach. Facilitate linkages between post contacts to create stronger civil society networks to advocate more effectively; provide access and training in social media to create broader platforms for local voices; equip post contacts with useful information and resources to deepen their impact

… this may very well be a good idea and continues to elaborate the role that PD could play as demonstrating a kind of value and credibility, rather than simply searching for new magic bullets to extol US virtues.

Yes, there needs to be ways to disrupt the kind of networks that sustain particular narratives to recruit and cultivate extremists. I’m not convinced this should be the central imperative for public diplomacy. This is one of those cases where the DoD can, and does, play a significant tactical and strategic role. And where we might find some disagreement over the definition of public diplomacy.

4. “Better inform policy-making (ensure foreign policy is informed upfront by an understanding of attitudes and opinions of foreign publics);”

This is the final frontier of PD recommendations – the avoidance of Murrow’s famous “crash landings.” I also think this kind of recommendation is nice to say, but it would require a considerable effort to combat the inertia the currently drives US foreign policy and diplomatic practice. Which is why the following statements are problematic:

Bolster capabilities to conduct and disseminate market and consumer research that tracks and analyzes important trends in global behavior and opinion

Leverage research and analysis to inform foreign policy formulation and tailor outreach to resonate with target audiences

Ensure that Public Diplomacy’s expertise and understanding of societal trends informs foreign policy formulation and implementation

First, the GAO has been repeatedly adamant about measurement and evaluation for US PD and strategic communication. But we need to make sure that there is use for the data. Put another way, what use is there for sophisticated measurements if there is no clear end for its use? In McHale’s strategic document there are a lot of different justifications and objectives for PD, which in turn would require a diversity of measures.

Simply deferring to the marketing state of the art is not a panacea. AC Nielson rating and certain kinds of polling may be of limited use when the goals of US PD transcend the management of customer relations or brand recognition. Rather, there may need to be some creative, innovative analysis that directly captures the implications of relationships and reveals routes to influence. For example, quantitative social network analysis and in-depth media ethnographies of diasporic populations might be used in conjunction with more traditional marketing-derived analysis to meet the needs of US strategic planning and assessment. Clearly, the US cannot simply import a plug-in-play evaluative framework derived from best practices in the commercial sector. The analysis solution will likely involve such practices, but also the creative input of PD professionals and cultural experts with years in the field.

Second, the contribution of PD to the formulation of foreign policy sounds so incredibly optimistic I am tempted to call in disingenuous. Rather, what I anticipate happening is not that PD will revolutionize diplomacy or US foreign policy, but that diplomatic practice will come to recognize the conceptual apparatus of public diplomacy as necessarily part of its own practices. PD won’t transform US foreign policy. PD – as both a concept and a set of practices – will be appropriated by those institutional actors empowered to actually do it. We can already see this with the DoD. At State, people like Alec Ross and indeed the implications of Secretary Clinton’s “architecture of cooperation” signal this kind of slow transformation in the identity of US statecraft.

5. “Deploy resources in line with current priorities (strengthen structures and processes to ensure coordinated and effective Public Diplomacy).”

This is the big whopper. It speaks directly to the question of leadership. Who is in charge of US PD? Who can effectively authorize and direct what is necessary for PD? Who can have the kind of resources and indeed, strategic agility, to actively craft a necessary and proactive US public diplomacy? While many want State to be in charge (and indeed defer to the direction of State), we then get statements like this from McHale:

The Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC), which is part of my office, is specifically chartered to support the NSC’s Global Engagement Directorate. We are expanding and upgrading GSEC to strengthen its ability to contribute across a broad range of U.S. government strategic communications and global engagement activities. To head the new GSEC, I have recruited Ambassador Richard LeBaron, formerly our Ambassador to Kuwait and one of our senior-most Foreign Service officers. He will arrive on the job this summer.

Ok, so we know that her office participates in meetings with both the NSC and DoD. But more importantly, where does the buck stop? It’s nice to know that the State Department’s “R” is a team player, but what now? I’m not suggesting that there needs to be central message control. I am suggesting the distributed responsibility that currently defines US public diplomacy leadership is a major reason that us PD critics are still having our critical discussion. This quote from McHale implies, at least in my mind, that maybe NSC could be directing global advocacy programs (which, btw, are only a part of what it means to do PD). Or more likely, that there’s enough implicit direction from the NSC so as to defray any substantive criticism about US public diplomacy’s strategic failures from the State Department. It’s not R’s failures. It’s the structure.

That said, I think this is ultimately a political issue that need to resolved by those with the authority and will to do so. As some have suggested, this issue of responsibility and resources may have to be worked out by Congress. Which isn’t a very comforting thought at this point. But I have some hope that leadership is out there.

More on McHale’s public diplomacy strategy presentation and the controversy surrounding it a forthcoming post.

I just posted a somewhat lengthy blog essay over at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy blog. It promotes Robin Brown‘s argument for a social network approach to the practice and study of public diplomacy.

As academics from various disciplines begin to look more aggressively at theoretical frameworks for public diplomacy scholarship, I think that social network analysis will be prominent. This insight isn’t exactly new -see the interesting work of Ali Fisher and Steven Corman – but I think it bears repeating. More importantly, I think that a social network approach isn’t just a programmatic way to study public diplomacy. It’s a valuable tool for evaluation and measurement that can directly impact how PD is both assessed and formulated.

There’s of course “room” for other theoretical perspectives and contributions (especially in normative, media, and critical theory), but social networks will increasingly offer compelling empirical measures that can speak to immediate concerns over the structures of influence – the terrain that PD and diplomacy must navigate in an informed way.

We now return you to our fairly regular, periodic blogging.

My own view is that the process of globalization and interdependence referred to by Craig both undermines the state’s ability to control its own fate and enhances the demands the people place on their state for protection from the downside effects of globalization. This seems particularly true over the past year of global recession. I am inclined to see the state as continuing to be the central foreign policy actor as Bill does but recognize that there are many other actors on the international stage from influential social movements to regional institutions that operate in the international political realm. Bruce is correct, in my view to call attention to the complexity of the world political environment and to point out that diplomacy (or political action abroad) no longer is in the purview of states alone.

Domestically, politics shape the contours of a state’s foreign policy decisions. Internationally, politics shape the landscape on which those foreign policies are implemented. Whether the instrument chosen to advance the foreign policy is diplomacy or military force, the foreign terrain is increasingly political. COIN theory, in particular, recognizes a 80%/20% split between the political and kinetic balance of effort. The shifting balance of power in the international system from West to East, accelerated by the current economic upheaval, also increases world politics as largely western based international norms are contested by rising powers representing distinct political cultures. All of this occurs in a media saturated global public sphere.

It is the confluence the normative and cultural dimensions of international affairs with the political, military and economic dimensions that create the complexities Bruce highlights and makes his question about whether public diplomacy is really still a separate instrument of statecraft valid. Craig is right to remind us of Bull’s insight into international society as the context. If the formation of a global public sphere has advanced to the extent that global politics is mediated much in the same way that domestic politics is, then diplomats must recognize that the public sphere is the policy sphere and be skilled at working citizen perceptions as well as the corridors of power. Secretary Clinton demonstrated that she gets it in her brave and bruising effort to address perceptions and exert influence in Pakistan this week. The hard slogging grassroots work at the nexus of foreign policy, public opinion, and politics abroad is the mission of public diplomacy. Is it separate and apart from the political function of statecraft? Not any longer. Does it matter whether those performing this political function abroad wear combat boots or wingtips? Yes, I think it does because of the projection of values, added costs and potential friction created when the policy intent is political contestation and the actor is military.

For a more academic elaboration of my argument please read my article Statecraft at The Crossroads: A New Diplomacy, Copyright 2009 The Johns Hopkins University Press. SAIS Review, Summer-Fall 2009, Volume 29, Number 2. (forthcoming).

The Moon Is In The 7th House

Friday, October 30, 2009

For the real deal, and with real links, please visit her site here.

Bruce Gregory’s interesting keynote at the George Washington University’s Global Engagement event a few weeks ago triggered an interesting response by the esteemed Amb. William Rugh, a professor of Public Diplomacy at The Fletcher School, Tufts University (and renowned for, among other things, very important scholarly work on Arab media). Bruce Gregory graciously shared this email response, and his own rejoinder to Rugh, so that others in the blogosphere could weigh in.

It should be noted that the exchange was indeed civil.

For the sake of reference, here are some key comments from the exchange, starting with William Rugh, who takes issue with the relationship of PD to Strategic communication (SC):

I will start by quoting Adam Ereli, who is a 20-year Foreign Service veteran, in the PD-cone, who served several overseas PD tours, and was most recently PAO in Baghdad, where he worked for a year very closely with General Petreaus and many others in the U.S. military. He was before that a senior advisor to Karen Hughes and the Deputy Spokesman of the State Department. He is now ambassador to Bahrain. Adam is a Fletcher graduate and returned yesterday to Fletcher to talk about public diplomacy. A student asked him to explain the difference between PD and SC. Adam said something very simple (I’m paraphrasing): ‘PD is diplomacy, SC is not. PD is done by diplomats, SC by people in uniform. DOD regards SC like any other weapon, say a tank, that aims, shoots, hits and moves on. PD is a long-term endeavor. It uses many instruments and the effect is hard to measure in the short run. Because DOD has thrown many more people at SC, real PD is sometimes forgotten, but it is an essential tool.’

PD is diplomacy. SC is done by people who are trained war-fighters. PD is done by diplomats trained to do PD. PD is not done by everyone and anyone. If you teach diplomatic history, you teach about relations between states, because that is what diplomacy is. PD is relations between a government and a foreign public.

I realize that the world has changed with the IT revolution. PD practitioners of course take that into account and use it. And the IT revolution does not make non-governmental communicators into diplomats. Yes, the NCIV participates in PD when its volunteers help international visitors who come to the US, but that is part of an official PD program paid for initially by the US government, even though NCIV helps financially by contributing volunteer time. I fear that calling all cross-border communication PD destroys the meaning of the word diplomacy. I fully agree that non-governmental cross-border communication is terribly important to understand, but let’s please call it something else, not diplomacy, or even “new public diplomacy”

If I may pick one other nit, I have problem with your essay where you quote Monroe Price saying that we need “transformation not adaptation”. That sounds nice but what does it mean? It’s easy to make a sweeping statement and say the bureaucracy needs to change fundamentally and is only doing so at the margins….

Here are some responses from Bruce Gregory:

In my GW remarks, and in my courses and publications, I argue that public diplomacy (PD) and strategic communication (SC) are “analogous.” I do not say they are identical. I chose “analogous” with care to indicate they are similar in function and marked by resemblance, but not by their origin. The central characteristics, time dimensions, and methods in public diplomacy can be found in strategic communication and vice versa. …

You say (paraphrasing Adam Ereli) that “PD is diplomacy, SC is not. PD is done by diplomats, SC by people in uniform. DoD regards SC like any other weapon.” I agree that many in DoD and the military services think of SC and ideas as weapons. But many do not. There are highly sophisticated views on PD and SC in military circles, and generalizing is a disservice….

The following comment begins to illustrate how the question of what a 21st century public diplomacy will look like starts to reflect broader developments in the understanding of diplomacy’s role in international relations.

You also say (your own words) that “PD is done by diplomats trained to do PD.” Elsewhere you have written that “a PD practitioner is a PD professional who has had actual experience doing public diplomacy abroad.” You go on to limit diplomacy to “relations between states” and PD to “relations between a government and a foreign public.”

These statements, in my view, are too narrow. First, they rule out many PD practitioners who are not diplomats (by this do you mean only Foreign Service Officers?) who fit within your traditional approach — Civil Service professionals in the Department of State and locally employed foreign nationals in U.S. embassies and consulates. They also rule out U.S. international broadcasters.

Second, you appear to exclude many others within government. These range from President Obama and Vice President Biden to many in U.S. departments and agencies who “understand, engage, and influence” foreign publics as an important part of what they do, and, yes, to people in uniform who do the same — and who do so in long-term as well as short-term endeavors…..PD of course is done by diplomats. But PD is not done “only” by diplomats.

Your argument begs important questions about the changing nature of governance, armed conflict, and diplomacy. Many scholars and practitioners, more in other countries than in the US, are struggling with what this means for PD and SC. Today, much more governance — the satisfaction of human needs and wants through rule based structures and legitimate interactive arrangements — takes place above, below, and around the state. Most armed conflict occurs “among the people,” not between state-based standing armies. What then are diplomacy and public diplomacy in this context? Just “relations between states” and just “between a government and a foreign public?” I think not.

I believe definitions are important. But my concern here is less with definitions than where we draw analytical boundaries in scholarship and practice. When you scrape away historical contingencies, diplomacy is communication between governance groups with representation that involves principals and agents. As Lund University’s Christer Jonsson and Martin Hall put it (quoting University of Minnesota diplomacy scholar Paul Sharp) in Essence of Diplomacy (2005): “Diplomacy is an institution representing a response to ‘a common problem of living separately and wanting to do so, while having to conduct relations with others.’” How we do this varies with time and circumstance. Jorge Heine, one of Chile’s leading diplomats, states this well when he argues that today’s “network diplomacy” is very different from the “club diplomacy” of the past.

Diplomacy is instrumental. It answers “how” questions, not “why” questions. It relates to governance and politics broadly defined – not primarily to education, journalism, business, and other ways that people communicate within and between societies. Public diplomacy imports methods and norms from these areas of social discourse, but PD is bounded by governance and its instrumental nature in relations between groups. PD is not cultural internationalism. I agree completely that not all cross border communication is PD and have never said so, all of which leads to questions as to what is meant by “citizen diplomacy.”

This response is meant to raise issues in study and practice relating to public diplomacy’s boundaries, agency, methods, priorities, and strategies. It also leads to a central question. Should we continue to distinguish PD from the broader concept of complex diplomacy in today’s multi-layered governance, thick globalism, rapidly changing information ecosystem, and strategic buffet of opportunities and threats? Is this distinction between diplomacy and public diplomacy still helpful analytically? Does it marginalize PD as a profession?

And here is my response to Bruce Gregory:

I am struck by how the definitional debate continues to plague the over-arching discussion of those concerned with PD. Granted, the interagency issue seems to loom large over the policy community now. Perhaps this is because the “reality” of PD for the United States involves the shared responsibility for communication with foreign publics, like an organizational microcosm of globalization itself. Just as globalization and its ICT infrastructure has eroded the traditional domains of nation-state sovereignty, allowed for new kinds of international actors, and imposed the need for more global governance – it’s also highlighted the need for a new kind of diplomacy, venues for communication, and attention to international
opinion.

I recall Jan Melissen’s comments back when he spoke at George Washington Univ… that Ministries of Foreign Affairs around the world are facing a crisis of identity, which explains some of the recent advancement of public diplomacy tools. It should come as no surprise that diplomacy studies within the larger discipline of international relations is also somewhat lackluster. It’s not that there aren’t excellent scholars, it’s that the central questions that reflect the reality of global politics are not always central to diplomacy studies. Perhaps, if our understanding of diplomacy itself were to undergo the kind of transformation that Monroe Price
suggests, we would find diplomacy as proactively defining the contours of international politics, rather than a tool perhaps increasingly ill-suited for the problems that are forced upon nation-states. Admittedly, diplomacy and PD are instruments, but such tools should reflect the changing nature of the actor needing such tools, and, the way in which the actor must relate to the broader “society” (with apologies here to Hedley Bull). As you [Bruce Gregory] said, “PD is not cultural internationalism.” But it is an imperative as much as it is a necessary instrument.

Public diplomacy as a broad concept captures the essence of what other aspects of international relations scholarship already recognizes and you elegantly describe in your letter. At the same time, I should stress that the traditional instruments of diplomacy aren’t going to go away. But the responsibility for these functions, the stakeholders, and the expectations are likely to change.

As for strategic communication, I would say that there are aspects of what the military does that indeed “weaponizes” communication, but this seems like a over-reaching generalization. Strategic communication often works to effect an environment that is a theater of operations – often increasingly *long-term* operations. Its aim is very often to shape the communicative and indeed interpretive context for how U.S. actions are perceived. And sometimes this is used to complement military operations, while in other instances it replaces such operations. As an aside, I think the growth of SC at some level tracks with the militarization of U.S. foreign policy around the world, but that’s a wholly other issue. The point is, SC is needed, because objectives are being conceived, coordinated, and carried out at a strategic and tactical level via the military.

The “success” of PD for the United States is not going to come once a specific cadre of professionals are recognized as important or uniquely situated as the stewards of public diplomacy. It is going to come when leadership recognizes what kinds of objectives and/or policies are really the domain of public diplomacy. In addition to strategy, this leadership should provide a viable direction for how to mobilize existing resources, develop new competencies, and more to point, be able to recognize what is necessary to address specific problems as public diplomacy problems.