by Craig Hayden

After a long semester and some writing projects finished, I’ve finally had time to revisit the news on public diplomacy. The recent exchange between James Glassman and Marc Lynch over the purpose of public diplomacy (and PD 2.0) are indicative – at least to me – that much of the discussion over U.S. public diplomacy’s strategic direction hinges on its relationship to broader strategic goals for foreign policy. What remains to be seen are examples of policies that push the implications of what Glassman is arguing for.

Glassman’s recent comments are worth reviewing. Speaking to an audience at last month’s InfoWarCon (amazingly not a science fiction convention), Glassman clarifies the real purpose PD 2.0: it is about de-legitimating Islamic extremist movements. He argued that PD is not about persuading people to like U.S. policies, but about fostering disincentives to see radicalization and violence as a desirable course of action. There are many things that Glassman says that are incisive assessments, recognizing both the complex landscape of media consumption and the pre-existing biases against attempts to persuade. Basically, the U.S. cannot simply explain itself. Attitudes toward media, news, and the U.S. in critical regions preclude straightforward advocacy as a viable PD strategy.

Glassman’s arguments are really about foreign policy operating environments rather than image management (and I’ve blogged about that here before). And yet, I have a nagging sense that his emphasis on facilitation (through social networking technologies and public-private partnerships, etc) really is about new forms of persuasion. And that’s not necessarily bad (a point I’m sure his audience of information operations specialists no doubt would agree with). But there needs to be a practical point where influence happens in all this facilitation. Put another way – the U.S can expect gains from PD 2.0 in two distinct realms: from facilitation (like the democracy video contest or the exchange.gov forum) in the form of modeling or representing U.S. values… or it can leverage these platforms to advocate some form of argument into the flow of messages. Glassman suggests a path to influence here:

Engaging, informing, and influencing using these new techniques, which promote a broad and deep conversation, into which we can inject our own messages and ideals – this is an approach that works. Or let me be more precise: I believe it works.

What Glassman appears to be saying here is that these facilitation efforts (via social networking technologies or otherwise) will be new means to deliver messages. And that seems to cut against what he’s said elsewhere about PD 2.0 – so perhaps I’m mistaken. What I do believe is that the implication of Glassman’s arguments is that older PD forms are not themselves sufficient (regardless of whether or not U.S. policies have contributed to the dismal state of opinion about the U.S.)

To be fair, Glassman has not argued to diminish or get rid of previous successful public diplomacy programs. Yet he has nonetheless received some abrupt criticism. Ambassador William Rugh, a renowned scholar of Arab media, argues that Glassman’s views are “badly flawed.” Rugh argues that the focus of Glassman’s approach to PD is too narrow (discouraging violent extremism). Rugh also suggests that the novel utilization of partner actors (proxies, really) and social networking technologies is not new – and that trained PD officers have been doing some version of this for decades. Importantly, Rugh also states that PD should include explaining the U.S. – by U.S. spokespersons and on the U.S.’s own terms. For Rugh – many people want to hear what the U.S. has to say.

I think Rugh’s points are well-taken – but as diplomacy scholar Jan Melissen has said, we can’t always look to history to solve our problems today in public diplomacy. If our functional, practical knowledge about the domain of public diplomacy is only informed by our case histories and practitioners, I believe this would limit options for thinking of new ways to “do public diplomacy.” And Rugh’s argument that “we’ve always done that” doesn’t solve anything. It highlights the wisdom and insight of previous periods, but doesn’t offer a ready translation into the current context. Again – remember that Glassman isn’t saying to throw out old practices, but increase funding to try new and novel approaches.

I think Marc Lynch’s rejoinder to Glassman offer a much more compelling strategic critique. Lynch argues that focusing on radical extremists grants them too much legitimacy, in an Arab public sphere where such groups are already marginalized. Currently, the debate about the U.S. is about its policies and the Israel/Palestine question, not the U.S. role as a kind of devil-figure in a cosmic war.
Lynch says:

…today’s discourse of resistance is mass-based rather than concentrated in a small radicalized fringe, and is fundamentally political rather than religious. That means a political response, not a response focused on delegitimizing violent extremism, and a public diplomacy oriented towards mass publics rather than strategic communications oriented towards a concentrated, marginal niche

Lynch rightly argues that U.S. PD and the overall obsession of its foreign policy rhetoric with jihadists has done much to amplify this groups importance and fuel rumors that the U.S. is anti-Islamic. He suggests a move to frame U.S. PD as actual engagement – an inclusive process that moves “beyond the counter-productive binary oppositions and threat inflation which have blocked progress for so many years.”

I actually don’t think that Lynch and Glassman have irreconcilable positions. What Lynch questions, I think, is the narrowing of strategic objectives. This kind of message and mission framing is a potentially dangerous reductionism that emboldens actors from al-Qaida to Iran.

So what about framing? When considering the strategic, orientational metaphors that we have for PD, I think we need to get past Glassman’s “War of Ideas.” We need to do this in part because of the very reasons that he identifies. Under his logic, we need to facilitate conversations that can advance causes that align with U.S. interests (such as the ’1 Million Against the FARC’). But does this call for martial metaphors? We are either in a “Grand Conversation” or a “War of Ideas.” I think these two metaphors are ultimately incompatible. Sure, I acknowledge the need for terms that mobilize and justify action on PD. The presence of anti-Americanism and the growth of violent extremism are serious threats that must be dealt with. But a “War of Ideas” implies a great civilizational contest – an existential struggle with the fate of the world in the balance. If we believe Lynch, the increasing marginalization of Al-Qaida-like organizations says otherwise.

This means that U.S. PD must not abandon previous methods that worked (and, incidentally, Glassman never said we should abandon them) but we should remain aware of the contours of political discourse in the populations that we wish to influence. Yet evidently, the debate over PD in the U.S. remains stuck on basic justificatory arguments. That and, of course, the institutional arrangement of responsibility and resources for U.S. PD. But that is a subject for another blog post.