By Craig Hayden

I attended a talk by James Glassman, Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, at the New American Foundation this past Monday. The subject of the talk was ostensibly, “Public Diplomacy 2.0,” while host Steve Clemons of the Washington Note proffered “Facebook/Twitter diplomacy” as a more appropriate title.

There are two significant developments in public diplomacy and U.S. foreign policy that are evident in his speech. Granted, some of the points have been made in prior engagements by Undersecretary Glassman, and in the rollout of such initiatives like “Briefing 2.0.” Yet this speech neatly encapsulates what is obviously a re-imagining of public diplomacy strategy – something akin to a policy compass that was clamored for in the avalanche of whitepapers and reports on PD in the past seven years. The two developments appear to be:

1) New Goals for PD: the reduction of violent extremism by offering alternatives to terrorism for at-risk populations around the world and…
2) New Priorities for PD Methods: the emphasis on providing public fora, and convening opportunities for citizens to connect and realize alternatives to extremism.

There are other aspects to Public Diplomacy 2.0 that Glassman articulates, such as partnerships with the private sector and an emphasis on speed (or perhaps, better reaction times to global message flows). But these latter points reflect less fundamental challenges to previous PD thinking. Karen Hughes had already launched the Rapid Reaction media monitoring unit to complement OSC efforts at quick media tracking, and had also exhorted private sector partnerships. Glassman’s Public Diplomacy 2.0, however, is something remarkably different in ambition.

Glassman was forthright in describing PD 2.0 as a form of “indirection.” It’s not entirely surprising, since the U.S. has suffered a “toxic brand” for some time, leading some to conclude that PD is doomed to suffer the fate of lipstick on a pig. If the “messenger” (the USFG) speaks louder than the message – whatever argument that is elaborated or not – then advocacy centric PD is doomed to fall flat.
But PD 2.0 is more than just “moving the goal-posts” so we can have a more apparently effective PD. It’s changing the reasoning behind the goals. Glassman’s speech lays out PD 2.0 as an “attitude” – probably a good description that illustrates a strategic orientation from which specific policies, technologies, and campaigns can be deployed to achieve objectives. PD 2.0 is not a bulleted list of policies, but a script from which different tactics can be derived, ideally enabling a kind of policy agility that isn’t the rudderless PD we are accustomed to in the U.S.

PD 2.0 is also apparently grounded in empirical evidence. Glassman cites the Facebook Group “One Million Voices against the FARC” as demonstrative of this new attitude. The connections enabled by social network technology offered a means to quickly mobilize opposition to a terrorist organization in Columbia, translating into real-world protest and galvanized public opinion. For Glassman, this kind of technology-enabled citizen activity achieves the goals of the U.S., without having to directly address these publics with the virtues of opposing the FARC. Taking a cue from this example, PD 2.0 would support, provide and design similar avenues for connection and public discussion. This is clear example of the “bridges” that public diplomacy scholar R. Zaharna described in her testimony to Congress years ago. PD is not information battle, it’s network warfare.

Yet there is a fundamental, and unelaborated, assumption that animates the premise behind “public diplomacy 2.0” – that the facilitation of communication bears directly upon the interests of the United States. Never mind the fact that PD 2.0 gently deemphasizes explanatory advocacy in its policy vision. In PD 2.0, actions or rather, facilitating the communicative action of others demonstrates the values, interests, and overarching ethos of the U.S.

A similar rationale was articulated in defense of Al-Hurra and Radio Sawa. Advocates of these programs argued that the format of these media outlets would themselves demonstrate the democratic, liberal values of the U.S. and hence attract viewers to U.S. perspectives. Western, objective journalism would be a vantage to U.S. political culture and ideally accrue (or repair) some form of soft power. Instead, this broadcasting strategy provided a needed lesson in the realities of the new Arab satellite media ecology. PD 2.0, however, aims to be even less obviously intentional in linking its programs to the “brand” of the United States.

There are significant parallels between PD 2.0’s emphasis on providing and facilitating communication with the cultural consequences of Manuel Castells’ vision of the “Network Society.” Castells has argued that one of the cultural underpinnings of the “Network Society” is a shared valuation of communication. He acknowledges that increasing global connectivity via the proliferation of ICTs and their attendant network relations may not necessarily result in any shared “global” identification. Indeed, connectivity may bring differing political and cultural identity projects into sharp contrast, furthering heightening global tensions. But he does place hope in the prospect that a nascent (and ideally global) culture that values communication for its own sake – open sourced, perhaps pluralistic, not necessarily liberal – may positively transform social life.

Similarly, PD 2.0 provides a basis for programs that bring people together, to talk, criticize, and debate. Through social network technologies and interactive media platforms, PD 2.0 embodies a more “diologic” PD. It also reemphasizes the “network” benefits of cultural and exchange diplomacy. All of these programs and ideas, however, draw upon the conclusion that for governments to directly speak to publics is insufficient in this globally mediated environment, and more likely counter-productive. PD 2.0 rather connects people to people. It does not fashion technology-enabled propaganda.

I have some lingering questions about this logic. Indirection more accurately refers to an indirect causal process, by which the U.S. government effects change through indirect means. The change desired is a reduction in terrorism and violence. The indirect means is by enabling publics to transform the environments at risk to the long-term goals of U.S. foreign policy.

I think PD 2.0 “works” if we discard the previously anticipated gains of U.S. soft power through public diplomacy. Playing a diminished or even invisible role in enabling venues for international social action does little to obviously burnish the image of the United States. It is not a reparative attitude. It is not, I think, nation-branding through indirection. It is altering the strategic environment by proxy.

So where does this leave soft power? Does the U.S., in the indeterminate future, gain some measure of soft power by playing host to proliferating networks of democratic, liberal opponents of what Glassman calls nihilistic “death cults?” The easy response here is that PD 2.0 is simply not about improving the image of the United States. Under the previous vision, an improved image of the U.S. would – in some abstract fashion – lead to the growth of democratic institutions and regimes that are peaceful and friendly to the U.S. The old view of image-management put national strategic outcomes as second order effects of positive opinion about the U.S.

In some sense, PD 2.0 does help U.S. soft power by “modeling” democratic modes of communication and political discourse. And, perhaps by opening a space for criticism of the U.S., it may repair some of the U.S. credibility worn away by contradictory rhetoric and policy to global audiences. I am less convinced, however, that PD 2.0’s assumption of network building translates tangibility into improved public opinion – there are simply too many leaps of faith to make in this formulation. This is not necessarily a damning critique, for as some have said, PD is not a “popularity contest.”

The logic of indirection is a rejection of linear advocacy. It’s not necessarily covert nor disingenuous. Rather, it’s a reflexive stance towards the fluid and pluralistic nature of opinion construction in global media. What I think PD 2.0 does reflect is a recognition of the mobilizing effects of our contemporary global media infrastructure. The social relations – the networks of affiliation and interest facilitated and conditioned by media technology – represent the real-time nature of political expression and influence. Even more traditional social movements now utilize and indeed embody, the pluralistic politics enabled by technologies of connectivity. As Castells has argued, “power” in this increasingly global social configuration lies in the gatekeepers (the network “switchers”) and the content providers for these networks. PD 2.0 is a tentative intervention into gatekeeping. By providing the conduits for global conversation, perhaps the U.S. can acquire a kind of network power. Even so, I think “soft power” benefits remain speculative. In the interim, at least PD 2.0 is squarely grounded in the articulated goals of deterring violence through global dialogue. And I will delay judgment on the evolution of soft power to an as-yet-measured network power.