by Shawn Powers

This June’s Foreign Policy web edition included an article by Steven A Cook, entitled “The Myth of Moderate Islam”. I’m guessing that the title wasn’t his idea. The article caught my eye for a number of reasons, one of which was the importance that public diplomacy scholars and practitioners, particularly those located in the United States, place upon engaging moderate Muslims in public diplomacy efforts. Indeed, when recently confirmed Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs James Glassman spoke earlier this month, he argued that public diplomacy was not about the popularity of the United States abroad, but rather about taking a side in the battle taking place within Islam itself: “We cannot step aside and simply watch Muslims slug it out among themselves.” If the ‘moderate Muslim’ is a non-existent Western construct, then it becomes unclear exactly what role public diplomacy can play in the current struggle to combat Islamist extremism.

Cook makes two arguments: first, that there is no definition of “moderate’” and second, that “there is scant evidence that extremists really do moderate once they assume power.” One of these arguments is just wrong, and the other is actually an argument better suited to support of idea of a Moderate Islam. I’d also like to comment on Cook’s proposed alternative – to ignore theology altogether and focus on those that can contribute “pragmatic solutions.” Isn’t that what got us into this mess in the first place?

First, let’s deal with the argument that “there is scant evidence that extremists really do moderate once they assume power.” Cook cites two examples: Hamas and Hezbollah. Both organizations have engaged in and endorsed extremist behavior. Those that thought that integrating such groups into the electoral process would moderate them were wrong, and predictably so. Democracy is not primarily about elections, but rather a culture of deliberation, public accountability, civic duty, and tolerance. Once these social mores are firmly in place, then elections are a helpful means of furthering the democratic process. Without these democratic ideals, elections more closely resemble a High School popularity contest than democratic governance. For more on this, see Amy Chua’s World on Fire and Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder’s Foreign Affairs article, “Democratization and War”.

More importantly, the failure of the electoral process to “cleanse” Hamas and Hezbollah of their extremist tendencies does not confirm the myth of the moderate, but rather provides a compelling case for why governments should lend their support to those individuals and groups that represent the democratic ideals outlined above. This does, however, beg the question of what actual constitutes a “moderate.”

Daniel Pipes does a nice job of parsing this topic in his article “Identifying Moderate Muslims.” While being critical of the ways in which the American and British governments have operationally defined “moderate Islam,” Pipes outlines a growing number of anti-Islamist Muslims that collectively constitute an expanding network of moderate Muslim opinion leaders and organizations.

According to Pipes, a recent RAND report titled Building Moderate Muslim Networks “posits a key role for Western countries: ‘Moderates will not be able to successfully challenge radicals until the playing field is leveled, which the West can help accomplish by promoting the creation of moderate Muslim networks.’” The report (and Pipes) suggest engaging with the emerging transnational network that is increasingly constituted by four key partners: “secularists, liberal Muslims, moderate traditionalists, and some Sufis.” Citing a number of successes from the American experience of winning the Cold War, the RAND report outlines a path for an effective strategy of collaboration with moderate Muslim groups.

Rather than engage with these networks of moderate Muslims, Cook instead suggests:

A smarter position is to avoid theological discussions altogether. As with all faiths, there will be heated debates between competing groups within Islam over the proper interpretation of sacred texts and the relationship between religion and politics….Given that moderation is in the eye of the beholder, Washington should not have an ideological litmus test for whom it wishes to engage. Rather, policymakers should focus on identifying those who can contribute pragmatic solutions to the many problems we confront in the region, “moderate” or not.

Such a strategy essentially disregards any role for public diplomacy in challenging violent extremism. Rather than collaborating and dialoguing with powerful networks whose interests (e.g. rule of law and democracy) coincide with those of the U.S., Cook’s strategy relies on the traditional American foreign policy decision-making rubric the legacies of which continue to plague U.S. foreign policy today. Two very short examples should make this point clear: American support for autocratic (yet, “pragmatically helpful”) regimes in the Middle East and the U.S. support of the Taliban in Afghanistan during the Cold War.

U.S. support for Saudi Arabia is based, largely, on the argument that they can help us secure our interests in the region (read: access to oil). It is the combination of our support of Riyadh and its disregard for the pillars of democratic governance that many in the Arab world point to as evidence of American hypocrisy. Perceived hypocrisy is the number one problem plaguing American public diplomacy, and is thus a significant barrier to our ability to effectively engage Muslims, moderate or otherwise.

The Taliban example is perhaps even more on-point. In order to drag the USSR into Afghanistan, the Carter administration began funding and training anti-Communist guerrillas in Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union invaded months later, the U.S. stepped up its support for insurgent groups, one of which was the Taliban. The thinking was that US support of the insurgent groups would lure the Soviet Army into overstretching itself farther into Afghanistan, thus offering the U.S. a “pragmatic ally” in weakening the USSR. This failure to utilize a “theological litmus test” resulted in the CIA’s support for and bringing to power of the Taliban, a group that implemented some of the world’s most egregious violations of human rights and 15 years later provided a stronghold for the world’s most dangerous terrorist organization.

Cook’s plan is a recipe for disaster. It represents the failed policies of the past that have prevented the U.S. from being able to credibly engage moderate groups in the region. Public diplomacy is critical part of 21st century foreign policy, and ignoring its import, particularly in the context of the Middle East, is simply dangerous. Let’s not go down that road again.

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