A recent excerpt from a speech about U.S. public diplomacy reminds me of the discursive terrain that continues to represent the commonly circulated descriptions and justifications for U.S. public diplomacy. Understanding these discursive limitations (in other words, attention to how we talk about what “we” should “do” in terms of P.D. policy) might point to why the public conversation continues to revolve around the same observations and criticisms that populate the parade of advisory reports and congressional testimony since 2001.
Consider the words of the new U.S. Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs – James Glassman, speaking to the Washington Institute’s Special Policy Forum on July 8, 2008. Glassman comes out swinging to defend, by defining, the notion that his job relates to a ‘war of ideas.” Here are some excerpts:
“In fact, I am convinced that, unless we get the war of ideas right, we will never succeed in meeting the most significant threat of our time. Unless we get the war of ideas right, the safety of Americans and the future of America’s way of life will be in continuous peril.”
…
“But starting in the early 1990s, the United States, in bipartisan fashion, began to dismantle this arsenal of persuasion. It was an act the Djerejian Group, of which I was a member, called “a process of unilateral disarmament in the weapons of advocacy.” Beginning shortly after 9/11, the tide began to turn again but slowly. “
…
“So let me be specific. Our mission today in the war of ideas is highly focused. It is to use the tools of ideological engagement — words, deeds, and images — to create an environment hostile to violent extremism. We want to break the linkages between groups like al-Qaeda and their target audiences. “
…
“Our priority is not to promote our brand but to help destroy theirs.”
These are of course taken out of context. But I bring them up to highlight the prevalence of crisis and martial metaphors in framing the obligations and motivations behind public diplomacy. More to the point, does a public diplomacy presented as an instrument of dialogue facilitation and rational exchange of ideas or culture fit within what rhetoricians might term the consequences of our “termistic compulsions?” Put another way, is U.S. policy imagination constrained by thinking about (and talking about) public diplomacy within a strategic discourse, which in turn perpetuates its status as something to be criticized and endlessly re-defined? The standards of how to talk about and judge public diplomacy change with the discourse that regulates how we perceive it.
Of course some aspects of public diplomacy are not controversial; many across the political and policy spectrum argue that it is necessary. It becomes debatable within a political context when one attaches it to outcomes that reflect contemporary political decisions (like influencing audiences shaped by “experiencing” the business end of U.S. foreign policy; or reducing the threat from terrorism - the focus of the GWOT campaign).
Obviously, there is a lot more to say about this – the effects of message framing and policy rhetoric on the larger accepted policy imagination. The possibility of such rhetoric shaping the policy landscape has been discussed in great detail by rhetorical scholars like Robert Ivie, Martin Medhurst, Philip Wander, G. Thomas Goodnight, and Thomas Kane. Nevertheless, I wanted to get the notion out there to build upon in future blog posts.